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Abstract. Recent studies have revealed the vulnerability of deep neural
networks: A small adversarial perturbation that is imperceptible to hu-
man can easily make a well-trained deep neural network misclassify. This
makes it unsafe to apply neural networks in security-critical applications.
In this paper, we propose a new defense algorithm called Random Self-
Ensemble (RSE) by combining two important concepts: randomness
and ensemble. To protect a targeted model, RSE adds random noise
layers to the neural network to prevent the strong gradient-based attacks,
and ensembles the prediction over random noises to stabilize the perfor-
mance. We show that our algorithm is equivalent to ensemble an infinite
number of noisy models f without any additional memory overhead,
and the proposed training procedure based on noisy stochastic gradient
descent can ensure the ensemble model has a good predictive capability.
Our algorithm significantly outperforms previous defense techniques on
real data sets. For instance, on CIFAR-10 with VGG network (which has
92% accuracy without any attack), under the strong C&W attack within
a certain distortion tolerance, the accuracy of unprotected model drops
to less than 10%, the best previous defense technique has 48% accuracy,
while our method still has 86% prediction accuracy under the same level
of attack. Finally, our method is simple and easy to integrate into any
neural network.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have demonstrated their success in many machine learning
and computer vision applications, including image classification [14,7,35,9,34],
object recognition [30] and image captioning [38]. Despite having near-perfect
prediction performance, recent studies have revealed the vulnerability of deep
neural networks to adversarial examples—given a correctly classified image, a
carefully designed perturbation to the image can make a well-trained neural
network misclassify. Algorithms crafting these adversarial images, called attack
algorithms, are designed to minimize the perturbation, thus making adversarial
images hard to be distinguished from natural images. This leads to security
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concerns, especially when applying deep neural networks to security-sensitive
systems such as self-driving cars and medical imaging.
To make deep neural networks more robust to adversarial attacks, several
defense algorithms have been proposed recently [23,40,17,16,39]. However, recent
studies showed that these defense algorithms can only marginally improve the
accuracy under the adversarial attacks [4,5].
In this paper, we propose a new defense algorithm: Random Self-Ensemble
(RSE). More specifically, we introduce the new “noise layer” that fuses input
vector with randomly generated noise, and then we insert this layer before each
convolution layer of a deep network. In the training phase, the gradient is still
computed by back-propagation but it will be perturbed by random noise when
passing through the noise layer. In the inference phase, we perform several for-
ward propagations, each time with different prediction scores due to the noise
layers, and then ensemble the results. We show that RSE makes the network
more resistant to adversarial attacks, by virtue of the proposed training and
testing scheme. Meanwhile, it will only slightly affect test accuracy when no at-
tack is performed on natural images. The algorithm is trivial to implement and
can be applied to any deep neural networks for the enhancement.
Intuitively, RSE works well because of two important concepts: ensemble
and randomness. It is known that ensemble of several trained models can
improve the robustness [29], but will also increase the model size by k folds. In
contrast, without any additional memory overhead, RSE can construct infinite
number of models f, where  is generated randomly, and then ensemble the
results to improve robustness. But how to guarantee that the ensemble of these
models can achieve good accuracy? After all, if we train the original model
without noise, yet only add noise layers at the inference stage, the algorithm
is going to perform poorly. This suggests that adding random noise to an pre-
trained network will only degrade the performance. Instead, we show that if
the noise layers are taken into account in the training phase, then the training
procedure can be considered as minimizing the upper bound of the loss of model
ensemble, and thus our algorithm can achieve good prediction accuracy.
The contributions of our paper can be summarized below:
– We propose the Random Self-Ensemble (RSE) approach for improving the
robustness of deep neural networks. The main idea is to add a “noise layer”
before each convolution layer in both training and prediction phases. The
algorithm is equivalent to ensemble an infinite number of random models to
defense against the attackers.
– We explain why RSE can significantly improve the robustness toward adver-
sarial attacks and show that adding noise layers is equivalent to training the
original network with an extra regularization of Lipschitz constant.
– RSE significantly outperforms existing defense algorithms in all our experi-
ments. For example, on CIFAR-10 data and VGG network (which has 92%
accuracy without any attack), under C&W attack the accuracy of unpro-
tected model drops to less than 10%; the best previous defense technique
has 48% accuracy; while RSE still has 86.1% prediction accuracy under the
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same strength of attacks. Moreover, RSE is easy to implement and can be
combined with any neural network.
2 Related Work
Security of deep neural networks has been studied recently. Let us denote the
neural network as f(w, x) where w is the model parameters and x is the input
image. Given a correctly classified image x0 (f(w, x0) = y0), an attacking al-
gorithm seeks to find a slightly perturbed image x′ such that: (1) the neural
network will misclassify this perturbed image; and (2) the distortion ‖x′ − x0‖
is small so that the perturbation is hard to be noticed by human. A defense
algorithm is designed to improve the robustness of neural networks against at-
tackers, usually by slightly changing the loss function or training procedure. In
the following, we summarize some recent works along this line.
2.1 White-box attack
In the white-box setting, attackers have all information about the targeted neu-
ral network, including network structure and network weights (denoted by w).
Using this information, attackers can compute gradient with respect to input
data ∇xf(w, x) by back-propagation. Note that gradient is very informative for
attackers since it characterizes the sensitivity of the prediction with respect to
the input image.
To craft an adversarial example, [11] proposed a fast gradient sign method
(FGSM), where the adversarial example is constructed by
x′ = x0 −  · sign(∇xf(w, x0)) (1)
with a small  > 0. Based on that, several followup works were made to improve
the efficiency and availability, such as Rand-FGSM [32] and I-FGSM [17]. Re-
cently, Carlini & Wagner [5] showed that constructing an adversarial example
can be formulated as solving the following optimization problem:
x′ = min
x∈[0,1]d
c · g(x) + ‖x− x0‖22, (2)
where the first term is the loss function that characterizes the success of the
attack and the second term is to enforce a small distortion. The parameter
c > 0 is used to balance these two requirements. Several variants were proposed
recently [6,20], but most of them can be categorized in the similar framework.
The C&W attack has been recognized as a strong attacking algorithm to test
defense methods.
For untargeted attack, where the goal is to find an adversarial example that
is close to the original example but yields different class prediction, the loss
function in (2) can be defined as
g(x) = max{max
i 6=t
(Z(x′)i)− Z(x′)t,−κ}, (3)
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where t is the correct label, Z(x) is the network’s output before softmax layer
(logits).
For targeted attack, the loss function can be designed to force the classifier
to return the target label. For attackers, targeted attack is strictly harder than
untargeted attack (since once the targeted attack succeeds, the same adversarial
image can be used to perform untargeted attack without any modification). On
the contrary, for defenders, untargeted attacks are strictly harder to defense than
targeted attack. Therefore, we focus on defending the untargeted attacks in our
experiments.
2.2 Defense Algorithms
Because of the vulnerability of adversarial examples [31], several methods have
been proposed to improve the network’s robustness against adversarial exam-
ples. [24] proposed defensive distillation, which uses a modified softmax layer
controlled by temperature to train the “teacher” network, and then use the pre-
diction probability (soft-labels) of teacher network to train the student network
(it has the same structure as the teacher network). However, as stated in [5], this
method does not work properly when dealing with the C&W attack. Moreover,
[40] showed that by using a modified ReLU activation layer (called BReLU) and
adding noise into origin images to augment the training dataset, the learned
model will gain some stability to adversarial images. Another popular defense
approach is adversarial training [17,16]. It generates and appends adversarial ex-
amples found by an attack algorithm to the training set, which helps the network
to learn how to distinguish adversarial examples. Through combining adversarial
training with enlarged model capacity, [20] is able to create an MNIST model
that is robust to the first order attacks, but this approach does not work very
well on more difficult datasets such as CIFAR-10.
It is worth mentioning that there are many defense algorithms (r.f. [3,19,13,8,36,27,25])
against white box attacks in literature. Unfortunately, as [2,1] pointed out, these
algorithms are not truly effective to white box attacks. Recall the “white box”
means that the attackers know everything concerning how models make deci-
sions, these include the potential defense mechanisms. In this condition, the
white box attacks can walk around all defense algorithms listed above and the
accuracy under attack can still be nearly zero. In addition to changing the net-
work structure, there are other methods [39,21,10,12] “detecting” the adversarial
examples, which are beyond the scope of our paper.
There is another highly correlated work (r.f. [18]) which also adopts very
similar idea, except that they view this problem from the angle of differential
privacy, while we believe that the adversarial robustness is more correlated with
regularization and ensemble learning. Furthermore, our work is public available
earlier than this similar work on Arxiv.
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Fig. 1. Our proposed noisy VGG style network, we add a noise layer before each
convolution layer. For simplicity, we call the noise layer before the first convolution
layer the “init-noise”, and all other noise layer “inner-noise”. For these two kinds of
layers we adopt different variances of Gaussian noise. Note that similar design can be
transplanted to other architectures such as ResNet.
3 Proposed Algorithm: Random Self-Ensemble
In this section, we propose our self-ensemble algorithm to improve the robustness
of neural networks. We will first motivate and introduce our algorithm and then
discuss several theoretical reasons behind it.
It is known that ensemble of several different models can improve the robust-
ness. However, an ensemble of finite k models is not very practical because it will
increase the model size by k folds. For example, AlexNet model on ImageNet
requires 240MB storage, and storing 100 of them will require 24GB memory.
Moreover, it is hard to find many heterogeneous models with similar accuracy.
To improve the robustness of practical systems, we propose the following self-
ensemble algorithm that can generate an infinite number of models on-the-fly
without any additional memory cost.
Our main idea is to add randomness into the network structure. More specif-
ically, we introduce a new “noise layer” that fuses input vector with a randomly
generated noise, i.e. x → x +  when passing through the noise layer. Then we
add this layer before each convolution layer as shown in Fig. 1. Since most at-
tacks require computing or estimating gradient, the noise level in our model will
control the success rate of those attacking algorithms. In fact, we can integrate
this layer into any other neural network.
If we denote the original neural network as f(w, x) where w ∈ Rdw is the
weights and x ∈ Rdx is the input image, then considering the random noise
layer, the network can be denoted as f(w, x) with random  ∈ Rde . Therefore
we have an infinite number of models in the pocket (with different ) without
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Algorithm 1 Training and Testing of Random Self-Ensemble (RSE)
Training phase:
for iter = 1, 2, . . . do
Randomly sample (xi, yi) in dataset
Randomly generate ∼N (0, σ2) for each noise layer.
Compute ∆w = ∇w`(f(w, xi), yi) (Noisy gradient)
Update weights: w ← w −∆w.
end for
Testing phase:
Given testing image x, initialize p = (0, 0, . . . , 0)
for j = 1, 2, . . . ,#Ensemble do
Randomly generate ∼N (0, σ2) for each noise layer.
Forward propagation to calculate probability output
pj = f(w, x)
Update p: p← p+ pj .
end for
Predict the class with maximum score yˆ = arg maxk pk
having any memory overhead. However, adding randomness will also affect the
prediction accuracy of the model. How can we make sure that the ensemble of
these random models have enough accuracy?
A critical observation is that we need to add this random layer in both
training and testing phases. The training and testing algorithms are listed in
Algorithm 1. In the training phase, gradient is computed as ∇wf(w, xi) which
includes the noise layer, and the noise is generated randomly for each stochastic
gradient descent update. In the testing phase, we construct n random noises and
ensemble their probability outputs by
p =
n∑
j=1
fj (w, x), and predict yˆ = arg max
k
pk. (4)
If we do not care about the prediction time, n can be very large, but in practice
we found it saturates at n ≈ 10 (see Fig. 4).
This approach is different from Gaussian data augmentation in [40]: they
only add Gaussian noise to images during the training time, while we add noise
before each convolution layer at both training and inference time. When training,
the noise helps optimization algorithm to find a stable convolution filter that is
robust to perturbed input, while when testing, the roles of noise are two-folded:
one is to perturb the gradient to fool gradient-based attacks.The other is it gives
different outputs by doing multiple forward operations and a simple ensemble
method can improve the testing accuracy.
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3.1 Mathematical explanations
Training and testing of RSE. Here we explain our training and testing proce-
dure. In the training phase, our algorithm is solving the following optimization
problem:
w∗ = arg min
w
1
|Dtrain|
∑
(xi,yi)∈Dtrain
E
∼N (0,σ2)
`
(
f(w, xi), yi
)
, (5)
where `(·, ·) is the loss function and Dtrain is the training dataset. Note that
for simplicity we assume  follows a zero-mean Gaussian, but in general our
algorithm can work for a large variety of noise distribution such as Bernoulli-
Gaussian: i = biei, where ei
iid∼ N (0, σ2) and bi iid∼ B(1, p).
At testing time, we ensemble the outputs through several forward propaga-
tion, specifically:
yˆi = arg maxE∼N (0,σ2)f(w, xi). (6)
Here arg max means the index of maximum element in a vector. The reason
that our RSE algorithm achieves the similar prediction accuracy with original
network is because (5) is minimizing an upper bound of the loss of (6) – Similar
to the idea of [22], if we choose negative log-likelihood loss, then ∀w ∈ Rdw :
1
|Dtrain|
∑
(xi,yi)∈Dtrain
E∼N (0,σ2)`
(
f(w, xi), yi
)
(a)≈ E(xi,yi)∼Pdata
{
− E∼N (0,σ2) log f(w, xi)[yi]
}
(b)
≥ E(xi,yi)∼Pdata
{
− logE∼N (0,σ2)f(w, xi)[yi]
}
(c)
≥ E(xi,yi)∼Pdata
{
− logE∼N (0,σ2)f(w, xi)[yˆi]
}
(a)≈ 1|Dtest|
∑
xi∈Dtest
− logE∼N (0,σ2)f(w, xi)[yˆi].
(7)
Where Pdata is the data distribution, Dtrain/test is the training set and test set,
respectively. And (a) follows from generalization bound (see [28] or appendix for
details), (b) comes from Jensen’s inequality and (c) is by the inference rule (6).
So by minimizing (5) we are actually minimizing the upper bound of inference
confidence − log f(w, xi)[yˆi], this validates our ensemble inference procedure.
RSE is equivalent to Lipschitz regularization. Another point of view is that
perturbed training is equivalent to Lipschitz regularization, which further helps
defensing gradient based attack. If we fix the output label y then the loss function
`(f(w, x), y) can be simply denoted as ` ◦ f. Lipchitz of the function ` ◦ f is a
constant L`◦f such that
|`(f(w, x), y)− `(f(w, x˜), y)| ≤ L`◦f‖x− x˜‖ (8)
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for all x, x˜. In fact, it has been proved recently that Lipschitz constant can be
used to measure the robustness of machine learning model [15,33]. If L`◦f is
large enough, even a tiny change of input x− x˜ can significantly change the loss
and eventually get an incorrect prediction. On the contrary, by controlling L`◦f
to be small, we will have a more robust network.
Next we show that our noisy network indeed controls the Lipschitz constant.
Following the notation of (5), we can see that
E∼N (0,σ2)`
(
f(w, xi), yi
) (a)≈ E∼N (0,σ2)[`(f0(w, xi), yi)+ ᵀ∇`(f0(w, xi), yi)
+
1
2
ᵀ∇2`
(
f0(w, xi), yi
)

]
(b)
= `
(
f0(w, xi), yi
)
+
σ2
2
Tr
{
∇2`
(
f0(w, xi), yi
)}
.
(9)
For (a), we do Taylor expansion at  = 0. Since we set the variance of noise
σ2 very small, we only keep the second order term. For (b), we notice that the
Gaussian vector  is i.i.d. with zero mean. So the linear term of  has zero
expectation, and the quadratic term is directly dependent on variance of noise
and the trace of Hessian. As a convex relaxation, if we assume ` ◦ f0 is convex,
then we have that d · ‖A‖max ≥ Tr(A) ≥ ‖A‖max for A ∈ Sd×d+ , we can rewrite
(9) as
Loss(f, {xi}, {yi}) ' Loss(f0, {xi}, {yi}) + σ
2
2
L`◦f0 , (10)
which means the training of noisy networks is equivalent to training the original
model with an extra regularization of Lipschitz constant, and by controlling the
variance of noise we can balance the robustness of network with training loss.
3.2 Discussions
Here we show both randomness and ensemble are important in our algorithm.
Indeed, if we remove any component, the performance will significantly drop.
First, as mentioned before, the main idea of our model is to have infinite
number of models f, each with a different  value, and then ensemble the result.
A naive way to achieve this goal is to fix a pre-trained model f0 and then
generate many f in the testing phase by adding different small noise to f0.
However, Fig. 2 shows this approach (denoted as Test noise only) will result in
much worse performance (20% without any attack). Therefore it is non-trivial to
guarantee the model to be good after adding small random noise. In our random
self-ensemble algorithm, in addition to adding noise in the testing phase, we also
add noise layer in the training phase, and this is important for getting good
performance.
Second, we found adding noise in the testing phase and then ensemble the
predictions is important. In Fig. 2, we compare the performance of RSE with the
version that only adds the noise layer in the training phase but not in the testing
phase (so the prediction is f(w, x) instead of Ef(w, x)). The results clearly
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show that the performance drop under smaller attacks. This proves ensemble
in the testing phase is crucial.
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Train+Test noise
Train noise only
Test noise only
Baseline
Fig. 2. We test three models on CIFAR10 and VGG16 network: In the first model noise
is added both at training and testing time, in the second model noise is added only at
training time, in the last model we only add noise at testing time. As a comparison we
also plot baseline model which is trained conventionally. For all models that are noisy
at testing time, we automatically enable self-ensemble.
4 Experiments
Datasets and network structure We test our method on two datasets—CIFAR10
and STL10. We do not compare the results on MNIST since it is a much eas-
ier dataset and existing defense methods such as [23,40,17,16] can effectively
increase image distortion under adversarial attacks. On CIFAR10 data, we eval-
uate the performance on both VGG-16 [26] and ResNeXt [37]; on STL10 data
we copy and slightly modify a simple model4 which we name it as “Model A”.
Defense algorithms. We include the following defense algorithms into comparison
(their parameter settings can be found in Tab. 1):
– Random Self-Ensemble (RSE): our proposed method.
– Defensive distillation [24]: first train a teacher network at temperature T ,
then use the teacher network to train a student network of the same archi-
tecture and same temperature. The student network is called the distilled
network.
– Robust optimization combined with BReLU activation [40]: first we replace
all ReLU activation with BReLU activation. And then at the training phase,
we randomly perturb training data by Gaussian noise with σ = 0.05 as
suggested.
4 Publicly available at https://github.com/aaron-xichen/pytorch-playground
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– Adversarial retraining by FGSM attacks [17,16]: we first pre-train a neu-
ral network without adversarial retraining. After that, we either select an
original data batch or an adversarial data batch with probability 1/2. We
continue training it until convergence.
Attack models. We consider the white-box setting and choose the state-of-the-art
C&W attack [5] to evaluate the above-mentioned defense methods. Moreover, we
test our algorithm under untargeted attack, since untargeted attack is strictly
harder to defense than targeted attack. In fact, C&W untargeted attack is the
most challenging attack for a defense algorithm.
Moreover, we assume C&W attack knows the randomization procedure of
RSE, so the C&W objective function will change accordingly (as proposed in [1]
for attacking an ensemble model). The details can be found in the appendix.
Measure. Unlike attacking models that only need to operate on correctly clas-
sified images, a competitive defense model not only protects the model when
attackers exist, but also keeps a good performance on clean datasets. Based
on this thought, we compare the accuracy of guarded models under different
strengths of C&W attack, the strength can be measured by L2-norm of image
distortion and further controlled by parameter c in (2). Note that an adversarial
image is correctly predicted under C&W attack if and only if the original image
is correctly classified and C&W attack cannot find an adversarial example within
a certain distortion level.
10 3 10 2 10 1 100 101 102
c
0
20
40
60
80
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
No noise
Init=0.05, Inner=0.02
Init=0.1, Inner=0.05
Init=0.2, Inner=0.1
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
-distortion
20
40
60
80
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
RSE
Mandry et al.
Fig. 3. Left : the effect of noise level on robustness and generalization ability. Clearly
random noise can improve the robustness of the model. Right : comparing RSE with
adversarial defense method [20].
4.1 The effect of noise level
We first test the performance of RSE under different noise levels. We use Gaus-
sian noise for all the noise layers in our network and the standard deviation σ of
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Init=0.1, Inner=0.05
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No noise
Fig. 4. Left : Comparing the accuracy under different levels of attack, here we choose
VGG16+CIFAR10 combination. We can see that the ensemble model achieves better
accuracy under weak attacks. Right : Testing accuracy (without attack) of different n
(number of random models used for ensemble).
Table 1. Experiment setting for defense methods
Methods Settings
No defense Baseline model
RSE(for CIFAR10 + VGG16) Initial noise: 0.2, inner noise: 0.1, 50-ensemble
RSE(for CIFAR10 + ResNeXt) Initial noise: 0.1, inner noise 0.1, 50-ensemble
RSE(for STL10 + Model A) Initial noise: 0.2, inner noise: 0.1, 50-ensemble
Defensive distill Temperature = 40
Adversarial training (I) FGSM adversarial examples,  ∼ U(0.1, 0.3)
Adversarial training (II) Following [20], PGD adversary with ∞ = 8.0256
Robust Opt. + BReLU Following [40]
Gaussian controls the noise level. Note that we call the noise layer before the first
convolution layer the “init-noise”, and all other noise layers the “inner-noise”.
In this experiment, we apply different noise levels in both training and testing
phases to see how different variances change the robustness as well as general-
ization ability of networks. As an example, we choose
(σinit, σinner) = {(0, 0), (0.05, 0.02), (0.1, 0.05), (0.2, 0.1)} (11)
on VGG16+CIFAR10. The result is shown in Fig. 3 (left).
As we can see, both “init-noise” and “inner-noise” are beneficial to the ro-
bustness of neural network, but at the same time, one can see higher noise
reduces the accuracy for weak attacks (c . 0.01). From Fig. 3, we observe that if
the input image is normalized to [0, 1], then choosing σinit = 0.2 and σinner = 0.1
is good. Thus we fix this parameter for all the experiments.
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Table 2. Prediction accuracy of defense methods under C&W attack with different c.
We can clearly observe that RSE is the most robust model. Our accuracy level remains
at above 75% when other methods are below 30%.
c = 0.01 c = 0.03 c = 0.06 c = 0.1 c = 0.2
RSE(ours) 90.00% 86.06% 79.44% 67.19% 34.75%
Adv retraining 27.00% 9.81% 4.13% 3.69% 1.44%
Robust Opt+BReLU 75.06% 47.93% 30.94% 20.69% 13.50%
Distill 49.88% 17.69% 4.56% 3.13% 1.44%
No defense 30.38% 8.93% 5.06% 3.56% 2.19%
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Fig. 5. Comparing the accuracy of CIFAR10+{VGG16, ResNeXt} and STL10+Model
A. We show both the change of accuracy and average distortion w.r.t. attacking
strength parameter c (the parameter in the C&W attack). Our model (RSE) clearly
outperforms all the existing methods under strong attacks in both accuracy and average
distortion.
4.2 Self-ensemble
Next we show self-ensemble helps to improve the test accuracy of our noisy mode.
As an example, we choose VGG16+CIFAR10 combination and the standard
deviation of initial noise layer is σ = 0.2, other noise layers is σ = 0.1. We
compare 50-ensemble with 1-ensemble (i.e. single model), and the result can be
found in Fig. 4.
We find the 50-ensemble method outperform the 1-ensemble method by ∼8%
accuracy when c < 0.4. This is because when the attack is weak enough, the
majority choice of networks has lower variance and higher accuracy. On the
other hand, we can see if c > 1.0 or equivalently the average distortion greater
than 0.93, the ensemble model is worse. We conjecture that this is because when
the attack is strong enough then the majority of random sub-models make wrong
prediction, but when looking at any individual model, the random effect might
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Fig. 6. Targeted adversarial image distortion, each column indicates a defense algo-
rithm and each row is the adversarial target (the original image is in “ship” class,
shown in the right side). Here we choose c = 1 for targetd C&W attack. Visually, color
spot means the distortion of images, thus a successful defending method should lead
to more spots.
bird car cat deer dog frog horse plane truck
No defense 1.94 0.31 0.74 4.72 7.99 3.66 9.22 0.75 1.32
Defensive distill 6.55 0.70 13.78 2.54 13.90 2.56 11.36 0.66 3.54
Adv. retraining 2.58 0.31 0.75 6.08 0.75 9.01 6.06 0.31 4.08
Robust Opt. + BReLU 17.11 1.02 4.07 13.50 7.09 15.34 7.15 2.08 17.57
RSE(ours) 12.87 2.61 12.47 21.47 31.90 19.09 9.45 10.21 22.15
Table 3. Image distortion required for targeted attacks.
be superior than group decision. In this situation, self-ensemble may have a
negative effect on accuracy.
Practically, if running time is the primary concern, it is not necessary to calcu-
late many ensemble models. In fact, we find the accuracy saturates rapidly with
respect to number of models, moreover, if we inject smaller noise then ensemble
benefit would be weaker and the accuracy gets saturated earlier. Therefore, we
find 10-ensemble is good enough for testing accuracy, see Fig. 4.
4.3 Comparing defense methods
Finally, we compare our RSE method with other existing defense algorithms.
Note that we test all of them using C&W untargeted attack, which is the most
difficult setting for defenders.
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The comparison across different datasets and networks can be found in Tab. 2
and Fig. 5. As we can see, previous defense methods have little effect on C&W at-
tacks. For example, Robust Opt+BReLU [40] is useful for CIFAR10+ResNeXt,
but the accuracy is even worse than no defense model for STL10+Model A. In
contrast, our RSE method acts as a good defence across all cases. Specifically,
RSE method enforces the attacker to find much more distorted adversarial im-
ages in order to start a successful attack. As showed in Fig. 5, when we allow an
average distortion of 0.21 on CIFAR10+VGG16, C&W attack is able to conduct
untargeted attacks with success rate > 99%. On the contrary, by defending the
networks via RSE, C&W attack only yields a success rate of ∼20%. Recently, an-
other version of adversarial training is proposed [20]. Different from “Adversarial
training (I)” shown in Tab. 1, it trains the network with adversaries generated
by multiple steps of gradient descent (therefore we call it “Adversarial training
(II)” in Tab. 1). Compared with our method, the major weakness is that it takes
∼10 times longer to train a robust network despite that the result is only slightly
better than our RSE, see Fig. 3 (right).
Apart from the accuracy under C&W attack, we find the distortion of ad-
versarial images also increases significantly, this can be seen in Fig. 2(2nd row),
as c is large enough (so that all defense algorithms no longer works) our RSE
method achieves the largest distortion.
Although all above experiments are concerning untargeted attack, it does not
mean targeted attack is not covered, as we said, targeted attack is harder for
attacking methods and easier to defense. As an example, we test all the defense
algorithms on CIFAR-10 dataset under targeted attacks. We randomly pick an
image from CIFAR10 and plot the perturbation xadv − x in Fig. 6 (the exact
number is in Tab. 3), to make it easier to print out, we subtract RGB channels
from 255 (so the majority of pixels are white and distortions can be noticed).
One can easily find RSE method makes the adversarial images more distorted.
Lastly, apart from CIFAR-10, we also design an experiment on a much larger
data to support the effectiveness of our method even on large data. Due to space
limit, the result is postponed to appendix.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new defense algorithm called Random Self-Ensemble
(RSE) to improve the robustness of deep neural networks against adversarial
attacks. We show that our algorithm is equivalent to ensemble a huge amount of
noisy models together, and our proposed training process ensures that the en-
semble model can generalize well. We further show that the algorithm is equiv-
alent to adding a Lipchitz regularization and thus can improve the robustness
of neural networks. Experimental results demonstrate that our method is very
robust against strong white-box attacks. Moreover, our method is simple, easy
to implement, and can be easily embedded into an existing network.
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